The combination of hyper winning streaks and losing spirals in 2026 have made the Miami Marlins a puzzle to quite a few diehard fans. Some want to place most of the blame (and very little credit) toward the front office and especially the manager and coaching staff for failing to send the team to the playoffs in 2026. This is simplistic and misleading for several reasons. First, the team, despite the long 12-game losing streak that followed a month and a half of playing the best baseball in the league, has still blown by expectations.
Preseason predictions from every baseball site had the Marlins projected to have a win total in the upper 60s to the lower 70s. The team has already surpassed those expected numbers, in just the second season of a big league roster fully comprising the choices of the new front office. Second, the team was only in a position to achieve this because of the players the front office acquired and because of the success of player development by the front office and the big league coaching staff. In many ways the perception of the team has been altered because 0f the rapid success of a very quick rebuild. Fans expect more because of the enticing potential of an already accelerated timeline.
The time f0r playoff contention is coming soon, perhaps as soon as 2027. Every baseball site, except strangely Baseball America, has ranked the Marlins a top ten farm system and is predicting a “new wave of prospect arrivals to the big leagues in 2027,” in the words of prospect analyst Kiley McDaniel of ESPN. In other words, the Fish are already a .500 big league team in the very early stages of a build, and are entering an expected phase of a wave of more major league talent coming, courtesy of the front office adding t0 the prospect depth in the minors, just a couple of years after having torn down and restructured the organization at every level.
Acquiring players discarded by other teams and turning those players into valuable contributors to the big league club, such as Otto Lopez and Heriberto Hernandez, has epitomized the front office success with player development. The fact that two minor league affiliates, AA Pensacola and low A Jupiter, made the minor league playoffs is indicative of successful player development at varied levels of the organization. This will pay dividends later at the major league level. As a result of turning around an awful player development system of the previous failed Jeter regime, this new front office deserves a lot of credit. Their player development approach is consistently applied at every level of the system—something that the Marlins have never had, and is moving in the direction of being among the best player development systems in the sport. While not yet reaching the level of the Rays, Brewers, Guardians, etc. the Marlins are moving toward that tier (and fast). Grade: A-.
I give the quality of the minor league prospects a slightly lower grade so far, only because the depth of good to very good players has yet to translate into superstar potential. The Marlins have ample depth in a range 0f positions and in pitching, but they don’t appear to have the upper end talent of the organizations that are leading the pack, including Milwaukee, Tampa, Cleveland, which are the realistic comps of where the organization wants to be. They also have had several key injuries to their top position player prospects, which especially hurt their rankings with Baseball America. Grade: B+.
The draft picks over the past two seasons have been solid if not spectacular. More time is needed to fully evaluate the front office here, but right now the club does not have many quick risers among their recent draft picks, with the exception of CF Cam Cannarella, who has moved fast to AAA after being drafted in 2025, and exceeded expectations at every level, poised to contribute in 2027. Early indications are that the 2025 and 2026 drafts were more successful than the 2024 draft, so we will see. Grade: B.
The front office has used extensive trades to replenish the minor league system. The best indication of making quite a few quality trades is the fact that 6 of the Marlins top 30 prospects were acquired in trades, according to Fish on First, including 4 of the top 10. While fair critiques could be made of the lack of adequate returns in some trades, emphasizing quantity of players acquired instead of potentially high-impact players, the overall picture appears very positive. Remember the farm system was near dead last under Jeter, typically ahead of only the Angels. Now it’s a top ten system, according to most publications, and that in part is due to trades. Grade: B.
The huge elephant in the room according to many fans is the ineptness of the manager and coaching staff in making in-game decisions. I’ve seen plenty of ridiculous fan posts accusing manager Clayton McCullough of being responsible for 10 or more losses due to everything from lineup construction to starting pitcher and bullpen management. These are absurd critiques that exaggerate the significance of lineups. Study after study has shown that lineup construction accounts for a very small differential in runs produced over a course of a season, with poor lineups reducing runs scored over an entire year by anywhere from 11-15 runs at the most. But even if you want to play the psychological guessing game of suggesting that players need regular ABs in predictable and repeatable situations, this does not hold up to statistical scrutiny. Most teams experiment with lineups a lot, especially those that want to maximize player matchups early and late in games. The Marlins have had extended periods of success with this, along with periods where players slumped. There is no smoking gun here to indicate that the lineup shifts are contributing to underperformance.
The area where the critiques make some sense is with early hooks for starters such as Ryan Gusto, Jansen Junk and Tyler Phillips. Mostly, I’ve been in favor of early hooks for these pitchers, except down the stretch, when the Marlins clearly had a weaker bullpen than they had most of the season, due mainly to key injuries, McCullough and the coaching staff would still pull these lower rotation starters ridiculously early, to the point of a paint-by-numbers statistical game which defied the eye test and common sense. Fans were right to be frustrated here. Do I think it cost the team a lot of wins? Most certainly not, but I think it was an issue. Grade for in-game management: C.
The weakest grade goes for the front office free agent choices, which have been an arsonist delight of early flame outs, pointless choices and wasted at bats and innings. The fact that the track record is so abysmal here is rather obvious: failure across the board over the last two years of playing in the low-end free agent market, which to be sure, helps predict negative outcomes. When you don’t spend much, you tend not to get much. No one should have been surprised when Christopher Morel failed or when Chris Paddock failed. I was surprised when the highest paid free agent, closer Pete Fairbanks, failed. I thought that was a good acquisition, but it was not. At least the team did not spend much money on these signings, collectively, but they were bad and they need to get better. Grade: D-.
Overall the direction is quite good and positive. The good news is the this new front office does seem very adaptable and self-critical. They are willing to experiment and also willing to change course. I look forward to giving them more A’s across the board when they start posting 90+ win seasons year after year, which Bendix announced as his goal. Speaking of Bendix, I do wish he had more clarity with the media and with the fans. I respect his baseball IQ a lot, but fans need a bit more than the same sound bites over and over. He could learn from veteran President of Baseball Ops Dave Dombrowski, who manages to provide detailed info to fans that is informative without giving away too much. It’s evident that the front office did not feel that 2026 was their year, and to me it made sense to basically stand pat at the deadline and to even trade a valuable hitter such as Liam Hicks in an area of some depth to acquire more talent for years ahead. A front office exec can be honest that building a foundation is an ongoing process and that the club is not exactly where they want it to be yet. That’s okay, and it doesn’t give away too much to try to say it. Overall grade: B.
View From Left Field 